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ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE TRIALS OF ABORIGINAL
INDIAN TITLE AND RIGHTS-AN OVERVIEW OF
RECENT CASE LAW
Kimberly Ordon*
[T]he rights of the aboriginal Indians were not derived from
treaties made with the United States ... their rights antedated
the treaties and continue to exist independently of them; ...
the Indian treaties constituted a surrender of rights or consisted
of restrictions placed upon them by the terms thereof; . .. The
Indians had an aboriginal right to hunt, [fish, trap, gather] on
the land, . . . and, since it has never been surrendered by
treaty, it still exists.'
This characterization of aboriginal Indian rights is not well
developed in legal opinion. Assertion of aboriginal rights has
been construed only in the context of the durability of aboriginal,
or Indian, title to land. Aboriginal title is the nontreaty
possessory right Indians have in lands they have continuously oc-
cupied since time immemorial.2 The occupancy of aboriginal land
includes the right to use the laihd consistent with traditional uses
such as hunting and fishing.' That aboriginal rights exist
separately from aboriginal title to land, just as reserved rights
can, is a question that awaits judicial resolution.
This note reviews and analyzes relevant case law on the sur-
vivorship of aboriginal rights. The note traces the origin and
evolution of aboriginal title and rights. It then discusses treaty-
reserved rights as ratifications of aboriginal rights. A third sec-
tion considers the means by which both aboriginal and treaty-
reserved rights can be extinguished, and the next part discusses
the issue of severability of aboriginal and treaty-reserved rights
from title to land. The final section of the note reviews case law
* Third-place Winner, 1985 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. State v. Quigley, 52 Wash. 2d 234, 324 P,2d 827, 828 (1958).
2. Note, Indian Title: The Rights of American Natives in Lands They Have Oc-
cupied Since Time Immemorial, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 655, 655-57 (1975). Aboriginal title
as a right corresponding to immemorial usage is founded upon the premise that Indians
used and occupied vast territories far in advance of encroachment by non-Indian cultures.
Indian title claims require exclusive and continuous use and occupancy of the land claims.
See also Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl.
184 (1966); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835).
3. See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
59
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which was directly decided upon the concept of preservation of
aboriginal rights or aboriginal title.
The Origin of Aboriginal Title
Aboriginal title, also known as original Indian title, is the right
of Indians to use and occupy lands they have held for time im-
memorial. Aboriginal rights include subsistence rights exercised in
a manner consistent with ancient custom and practice.' The legal
doctrine that acknowledges aboriginal title and rights evolved out
of the policies of European nations toward Indians. European
nations settling in the New World recognized possessory rights in
the original Indian inhabitants by imposing their own concepts of
property ownership on tribes when negotiating for land to settle
upon.' It was through this policy that recognition of aboriginal
title was achieved.
Europeans, and later the United States government, recognized
tribes' aboriginal interests, but were left with defining Indian land
ownership in relation to that of discovering nations. The doctrine
of discovery, as articulated in Johnson v. McIntosh,6 defines the
ownership relationship between the discovered and the
discoverers. "[D]iscovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other
European governments which title might be consummated by
possession." 7 The United States Supreme Court determined in
McIntosh that title vested in the discovering government, but in
relying on precedent, noted that the occupying Indians retained
rights in the land as "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to possession of it." ' Later, the
4. F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 442-43 (R. Strickland et al. eds.
1982), citing Mitchel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 745:
"Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and
modes of life; their hunting grounds were as much in their actual possession as the
cleared fields of the whites; and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in their own
way and for their own purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them,
made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals."
5. Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1215, 1220-26 (1980). Newton analyzes the development of the doctrine of
discovery through the judiciary, citing Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711
(1835); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
6. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
7. Id. at 573.




Supreme Court in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia laid the founda-
tion for tribes having valid and enforceable rights in their
ancestral lands.9 "[The Indians are acknowledged to have an un-
questionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands
they occupy. ' n °
Aboriginal title is a legally enforceable right of possession;
however, it is subordinate to vested fee title. The Supreme Court
in McIntosh emphasized that as a result of discovery the Indians'
"power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle,
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it."" Ex-
clusive title over the land is qualified because it is "subject only
to the Indian right of occupancy."' 2 Although exclusive title does
not vest in the occupying tribe, aboriginal title is a significant
right that coexists with title in the United States. In Cherokee Na-
tion, the Court called occupancy based upon aboriginal title "as
sacred as the fee simple, absolute title of the whites.""
The Origin of Treaty-Recognized Title and Reserved Rights
Just as European powers recognized the rights of occupancy
and use by the Indians of their native lands, they recognized
tribes as separate and sovereign nations. The Europeans, and
later the United States, carried on treaty negotiations with tribes,
drawing upon principles of international law to guide them.
Treaties were made with tribes for a variety of purposes, but to a
large degree they were aimed at peaceful relationships and ces-
sions of Indian lands for non-Indian settlers." Treaties are a
primary source of recognizing aboriginal title and reserving
aboriginal rights.
Treaty-reserved rights and recognized title are aboriginal rights
and title preserved through the treaty-making and ratification
process. Treaties formally recognized and acknowledged
aboriginal title to land. Treaty-reserved rights to use the land can
9. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
10. Id. at 17.
11. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
12. Id. See also United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 47 (1946).
The U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right of occupancy based on aboriginal title is
"more than a merely moral claim for compensation."
13. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 48.
14. See F. COHEN, supra note 4, at 62-70. For a discussion of the development of
recognized title, see Newton, supra note 5, at 1232-41.
No. 11
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be exercised only if there are aboriginal rights upon which they
can be recognized."5 Additional treaty rights, as distinct from
reserved rights, can and often did include promises to provide
payment, goods, and/or services to tribes.
Formal recognition of aboriginal title need not be accom-
plished by treaty. Aboriginal title can also be recognized and pre-
served by executive order or act of Congress. In Mattz v.
Arnett,' 6 a dispute arose that was resolved by recognizing a de
facto reservation as Indian country. An executive order of 1855
created the Klamath River Reservation for occupancy by Califor-
nia Indians. The site was the aboriginal home of the Yuroks, who
continued to occupy the area even after the reservation had been
terminated in 1892 by an act of Congress.' 7 The land was later
opened for allotment and for settlement by non-Indians. Despite
these actions, services continued to be provided to the Indians by
the Department of the Interior. The Supreme Court held that the
reservation had not been effectively terminated and that its status
as Indian country was "reinforced by repeated recognition of the
reservation status of the land after 1892 by the Department of the
Interior and by Congress."' 8 In finding that the reservation con-
tinued to exist, the Court cited with approval an earlier Depart-
ment of Interior opinion on the same issue that held:
[Tihe Indians have lived upon the described tract and made it
their home from time immemorial; and it was regularly set
apart as such by the constituted authorities, and dedicated to
15. Proof of treaty-reserved rights is accomplished by the same immemorial custom
and practice requirements used to show aboriginal title and rights. See supra note 5-7 and
accompanying text. In United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979),
app. pending, the Bay Mills and Sault Ste. Marie tribes sought to enjoin the state of
Michigan from interfering by regulation with their treaty-protected fishing rights. The
right to fish in the Great Lakes was an aboriginal right that was implicitly reserved and re-
tained in a treaty of cession. In determining the scope of the right to fish, the federal
district court required the tribes to document their immemorial use.
Of course, not every treaty of cession leaves the Indian grantors with reserved fishing
rights. In order for the right to exist in the first instance, it must be shown that the In-
dians were in fact using the resource, i.e., that they exercised this right, subsumed
within their larger, aboriginal right to their land and water. Thus, the factual predicate
for the reserved fishing right is the documented historic, ethno-historic, anthropologic
and archeologic evidence.
Id. at 213.
16. 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
17. Id. at 496.
18. Id. at 505.
[Vol. 13
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that purpose with all the solemnities known to the law, thus
adding official sanction to a right of occupation already in ex-
istence. 19
Interpreting the scope of treaty-reserved rights requires taking
note of aboriginal use. Treaties, and other acts of Congress or the
executive, recognize aboriginal title to land and reserve use of the
land consistent with its aboriginal use. The existence of a treaty
does not, in and of itself, extinguish aboriginal rights; rather, it
preserves or modifies them. In United States v. Winans, 20 the
Supreme Court interpreted a treaty made with the Yakima In-
dians that protected their right to fish at all "usual and accus-
tomed sites." The Court held that "only a limitation of
[aboriginal rights], however, was necessary and intended, not a
taking away. In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights
to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of
those not granted." 2
Extinguishment of Aboriginal or Treaty-Reserved Rights
Aboriginal title and rights reserved by treaty, executive order,
or statute are an acknowledgment of rights that have existed since
time immemorial. Rights preserved by these means are subject to
extinguishment or alteration by tribal or congressional actions
specifically intended to terminate those rights. Aboriginal title
and rights are extinguishable at the will of the sovereign, but for
effective termination of rights of aboriginal origin a clear and ex-
press intention on the part of Congress is required just as though
the rights were treaty-reserved.
Extinguishing Aboriginal Title or Rights
The means by which extinguishment of aboriginal title can be
accomplished were enumerated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railway,22 which concluded that extin-
guishment could occur "by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by
19. Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added), citing Crichton v. Shelton, 33 I.D. 205, 212-13
(1904).
20. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
21. Id. at 381. See also Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water rights
reserved were based upon aboriginal use with a priority date of time immemorial); United
States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), reh. denied (1984) (reserves water suffi-
cient to maintain hunting and fishing rights with a priority date of time immemorial).
22. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
No. I1] NOTES
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the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occu-
pancy, or otherwise." 23 In Santa Fe the Court was determining
the extent of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights. The
Hualapai Indians, in the face of increasing encroachment on their
aboriginal lands by non-Indians, requested Congress to provide
them a reservation for their exclusive use. In reviewing the chain
of events leading to the request, the Supreme Court refused to
find that previous congressional attempts to relocate the Indians
to a distant reservation and forcible military removal unauthor-
ized by congressional mandate had extinguished the tribe's title
and rights in their aboriginal lands.24 Instead, the Court held that
the tribe's request for a reservation and acquiescence in encroach-
ment upon their aboriginal lands extinguished their aboriginal ti-
tle and rights. The tribe was
in substance acquiescing in the penetration of white settlers on
condition that permanent provision was made for them too. In
view of this historical setting, it cannot now be fairly implied
that tribal rights of the Walapais [sic] in lands outside the re-
servation were preserved .... Hence, acquiescence in that ar-
rangement must be deemed to have been a relinquishment of
tribal rights in lands outside the reservation and notoriously
claimed by others.2"
Later, the Supreme Court again considered extinguishment of
aboriginal title and the nature of aboriginal rights. In Tee-Hit-
Ton v. United States,26 the Tlingit Indians were suing the United
States for compensation under the fifth amendment for an unjust
taking of timber located on aboriginal lands withdrawn by the
government to create a national forest. The Court held that the
tribe's right in their aboriginal land was a permissive right of oc-
cupancy and not subject to compensation for takings under the
fifth amendment. 27 Had the tribe's aboriginal rights been
recognized by Congress as rights of permanent occupation of the
land, compensation would have been required.28
23. Id. at 347, citing Beecher v. Wetherby, 97 U.S. 517 (1877).
24. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 353.
25. Id. at 358.
26. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
27. Id. at 279. See also Newton, supra note 5, at 1217-20. In analyzing Tee-Hit-Ton,
Newton interpreted the Supreme Court's finding as having relied upon the view that the
act of discovery by the sovereign nation was of itself sufficient to extinguish aboriginal ti-
tle to land. Compensation under the fifth amendment was available only when Congress
recognized a permanent right of occupancy in land.




In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, (Oneida I),29
the Supreme Court discussed the impact of discovery by
sovereign nations on aboriginal title and ruled that "[tihat right,
sometimes called Indian title and good against all but the
sovereign, could be terminated only by sovereign act." 3" The
Court noted that Indian title "was extinguishable only by the
United States."' '3
Extinguishing Treaty-Recognized Title or Reserved Rights
As with aboriginal title and rights, several methods of extin-
guishment of treaty-recognized title or reserved rights can be ef-
fective. For example, treaty-reserved title can be extinguished by
acts such as cession agreements or treaties of cession, and by
compensation. Nevertheless, any attempt to extinguish treaty-
recognized title or reserved rights must be clearly and expressly
intended by Congress.
In Menominee Tribe v. United States,32 the Supreme Court
held that the Menominee Indian Termination Act, severing the
federal relationship with the tribe, had not extinguished the
tribe's hunting and fishing rights on ceded lands. The Court
found it "difficult to believe that Congress, without explicit state-
ment, would subject the United States to a claim for compensa-
tion by destroying property rights conferred by treaty.' '33
29. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
30. Id. at 667.
31. Id. The relationship between the United States and Indian tribes has been de-
fined as a relationship of two sovereigns, between which no other can interfere. In
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Supreme Court held that states
were preempted from taking actions that affected the U.S./tribal relationships. In
Worcester, the state of Georgia was barred from extinguishing the property rights and
rights of self-government of the Cherokee Tribe. The Court made clear that the relation-
ship between Indian.5 and the U.S. was predominant and ruled that any attempt at ex-
tinguishing that relationship could only be valid if done by the United States. Id. In
deciding County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida 11), 470 U.S. 226 (1985), the
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that explicit congressional expression was required
for extinguishment of aboriginal land rights. In discussing the claims of the Oneidas to
land wrongfully held by the state of New York, the Court held that there was no explicit
extinguishment of the tribe's rights in Congress' passage of the noninterzourse acts. Fur-
ther, since the tribes' assertions lie in the federal common law, no federal statute of
limitations could bar the claims resulting in an extinguishment through the passage of
time. Id. at 236-40.
32. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
33. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). See also Washington v. Washington State Comm'l
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979), where the Supreme Court states
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The federal district court in United States v. Felter ruled on the
hunting and fishing rights of mixed-blood Utes with whom the
federal relationship had been terminated.3" Claims in the alterna-
tive were raised by the Utes: either their rights were reserved and
had not been lost by termination, or they were unextinguished
aboriginal rights. In concluding that the rights survived termina-
tion and had been preserved statutorily, the Court analyzed the
issues of extinguishing both reserved and aboriginal rights. It
noted that the source of the rights was not material and that
"[t]he standards for determining whether Congress has abrogated
Indian property rights are no less stringent as to rights recognized
in legislation than they are as to aboriginal rights." 3 The Court
clearly ruled that the same mode of extinguishment of either kind
of rights can be accomplished only by acts initiated and recog-
nized by the United States Congress.
Use Rights as Independent from Title to Land
Durability of Treaty-Reserved Rights Separate from Title
Treaty-reserved rights include hunting, fishing, gathering, ric-
ing, access to water, and any other attributes of the Indian
aboriginal way of life, whether expressly mentioned in a treaty or
not. 6 Treaty-reserved rights are severable from ownership of the
land; they can be exercised independent of title or occupancy of
the land. In some instances treaty-reserved rights continue to exist
after termination of an Indian reservation and, in some cases,
survive termination of the federally recognized status of a tribe.
In United States v. Winans," the Supreme Court interpreted
off-reservation treaty rights reserved by the Yakima Indians. The
that "[aibsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find Con-
gressional abrogation of treaty rights." In Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voight, 700 F.2d
341 (7th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals recognized and applied Supreme Court declara-
tions that "made clear that abrogation of treaty recognized title requires an explicit state-
ment by Congress." Id. at 352.
34. 546 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd, 752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985). The
court of appeals, in affirming Feller, refused to impute congressional intent to abrogate
the mixed-blood Utes' right to hunt and fish. Some clear expression to do so must be evi-
dent.
35. 546 F. Supp. at 1011.
36. See generally, Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404 (1968), which held that use and
occupancy of the land was to be in a manner consistent with custom; held as Indian lands
are held.




tribe had ceded its lands and removed itself to a smaller area by a
treaty of cession that reserved to them the "right of taking fish at
all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
Territory." 38 The Court found that this language provided for ex-
ercise of the tribe's fishing rights independent of aboriginal title
or occupancy rights in the land. It held that the "Indians were
given a right in the land-the right to occupy it to the extent and
for the purpose mentioned." 9
The court of appeals in Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South
Dakota found that hunting and fishing rights existed separate
from the land.40 The tribe was exercising hunting and fishing
rights on new shorelines created by the inundation of aboriginal
lands by a dam. The court held that the rights existed despite the
loss of occupancy in the land.
Several additional cases have found use rights exist indepen-
dent of title to land. In Kimball v. Callahan,4' the court of ap-
peals was faced with a situation similar to Menominee Tribe, in
which treaty rights were asserted after termination of the federal-
tribal relationship.4 2 Here, however, the court found that the
Klamath Termination Act expressly preserved hunting and fishing
rights after occupancy in aboriginal land had ceased. In United
States v. Felter, compensation for lands was held not to be an ex-
tinguishment of hunting and fishing rights. An extinguishment of
use rights would have to be clearly expressed by Congress.
4 3
Finally, in Lac Courte Oreilles Band v. Voight," a treaty ceding
aboriginal lands and providing for removal of the tribe did not
extinguish hunting and fishing rights on the ceded lands. The
court of appeals held that treaty-reserved rights did not require
title to the land.4 5
Durability of Aboriginal Rights Separate from Title
Unlike treaty-reserved rights, the issue of severance of
38. Id. at 378.
39. Id. at 381.
40. 711 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1983).
41. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974).
42. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
43. Feller, 546 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Utah 1982).
44. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). Here, the court of appeals was asked to determine
the effect of treaties of cession and removal efforts on the band's right to continue sub-
sistence activities on the ceded land. The court found that the right to use the ceded land
was reserved both explicitly and impliedly in treaty language. The court held that the use
rights continued in force until Congress expressly extinguished them. Id. at 353.
45. Id. at 352.
No. I1]
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aboriginal rights from title is less frequently addressed and has
been examined only in the context of state court proceedings.
Analysis of the durability of aboriginal rights separate from title
has generally followed, with some modification, the rationale ap-
plied to determine the durability of treaty-reserved rights. While a
clear expression of congressional intent is required to extinguish
aboriginal title, treaty-recognized title, and treaty-reserved rights,
there is a curious departure in relation to aboriginal rights.
In State v. Quigley,16 a Chinook Indian asserted an aboriginal
right to hunt on his own land purchased in fee from a non-
Indian. The land was located within the aboriginal territory of his
tribe, and the tribe, having no treaty with the United States, had
not ceded any land voluntarily. The hunter claimed that because
there had been no treaty, aboriginal rights still existed. The
Washington Supreme Court held that extinguishment had oc-
curred and that "[tihe fact that the appellant's predecessor in in-
terest in the land in question was non-Indian, is evidence that
aboriginal Indian rights in regard to such land had been extin-
guished before he acquired it." 4 Calling the situation a "novel
theory presented as a case of first instance,"" 8 the court applied
traditional property law concepts, foregoing any attempt to apply
treaty rights analysis, a clear parallel to the situation at hand, to
reach its determination. By failing to employ legal concepts ap-
plied to analyze the extent of treaty rights, the court avoided the
question of severing aboriginal rights from land. Relying on
Johnson v. McIntosh, the court called aboriginal title a "right of
occupancy only""9 and found any use rights extinguished by vir-
tue of the fact that the property had been acquired from a non-
Indian. 0 This rationale ignores the fact that McIntosh addressed
the issue of the title to land rather than rights to use land.
In State v. Keezer,5' the Chippewa Indians'asserted aboriginal
rights to fish and gather rice on unceded land within the
aboriginal territory of several tribes who were signatories to a
treaty that recognized their right to use and occupy land in the
Northwest Territory, an area without definite boundaries. The
Chippewas asserted that the treaty raised their aboriginal rights
46. 52 Wash. 2d 234, 324 P.2d 827 (1958).
47. Id., 324 P.2d at 829.
48. Id., 324 P.2d at 828.
49. Id., 324 P.2d at 829.
50. Id.




into treaty rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled otherwise,
saying that the treaty merely acknowledged a right of occupancy
and that upon relinquishment of land to the United States all use
rights were extinguished. Because of the difficulty of labeling the
rights in question as either aboriginal rights or treaty rights, the
court posed its decision in the alternative. If the rights were
aboriginal rights, extinguishment of aboriginal title resulted in ex-
tinguishment of any use rights. 2 The court reasoned that if the
rights were treaty rights, lack of an express reservation of them in
the treaty of cession resulted in their loss." Finally, if any of
these means of extinguishment were inadequate, the court found
that an executive order revoking all rights to the land effectively
resulted in extinguishment." ' By virtue of the court's failure to
decisively label the rights at issue as aboriginal or treaty-reserved,
it is difficult to assess the impact of Keezer. No analysis of loss of
aboriginal rights as an incident of loss of title was offered. The
majority of the opinion is devoted to extinguishment of those
rights through clearly expressed congressional actions.
In In re Wilson,55 the California Supreme Court issued an opi-
nion that demonstrates a decided disregard for well-founded prin-
ciples of Indian law and an extraordinary ability to selectively,
and erroneously, interpret long-standing judicial opinion. The
court sets the mood by beginning its opinion with a rhetorical
question:
May an exception to the law, which otherwise applies equally
to every Californian, be carved out for a special class of indi-
viduals so that a person may violate, with impunity, a criminal
statute which prohibits hunting out of season on public or
private land simply because he belongs to an Indian tribe which
once occupied the land.5 6
No one can doubt that the answer was in the negative. A Pit
52. Id. at 721. For this interpretation, the court relies on United States v. Minnesota,
466 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Minn. 1979), aff'd sub nora. Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians
v. Minnesota, 614 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905. In Red Lake
Band, the Court ruled that aboriginal rights are "mere incidents of Indian title, not rights
separate from Indian title, and consequently if Indian title is extinguished so also would
these aboriginal rights be extinguished." Id. at 1385. See also text accompanying note 60
infra.
53. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d at 720-21.
54. Id.
55. 30 Cal. 3d 21, 634 P.2d 363, 177 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1983).
56. Id., 634 P.2d at 364, 177 Cal. Rtpr. at 337.
No. 1]
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River Indian was asserting aboriginal hunting rights on aboriginal
lands. Earlier, in United States v. Gemmill,17 the court of appeals
found that the Pit River Tribe's aboriginal title had been ex-
tinguished by actions of the federal government. In reliance on
that finding, the California court concluded that all aboriginal
hunting and fishing rights had also been extinguished. The court
based its finding on state court opinions that only indirectly ad-
dress the issue58 and federal opinions dealing with treaty rights. 9
Despite its reliance on treaty rights cases, the court ignored the
legal severance of rights from title in treaty cases.
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota is the only
federal case that discusses the issue of the aboriginal rights as
severable from aboriginal title. 60 Red Lake Band is, however, an
adjudication of treaty-reserved rights. The Red Lake Band had
agreed to cede lands by treaty but was orally promised the right
to hunt, fish, and trap on the ceded land. The court of appeals
strictly interpreted the language of the treaty in which the band
agreed to relinquish and convey to the United States 'all our
right, title and interest in and to' all ceded land," to find that
there were no retained rights.6" In discussing aboriginal rights, the
court said that use rights were "mere incidents of Indian
title, . . . and consequently if Indian title is extinguished so also
would these aboriginal rights be extinguished." ' 62
Recent Assertions of Aboriginal Rights
No case directly addressing the issue has held that aboriginal
rights are extinguished solely because there is a loss of aboriginal
title. Extinguishment has been demonstrated in other ways, such
as by treaty or Indian Claims Commission compensation.
In State v. Coffee,63 an Idaho Kootenai Indian asserted her
57. 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. Wilson, 634 P.2d at 368-69. The court cites State v. Keezer, 292 N.W.2d 714
(Minn. 1980) and State v. Coffee, 97 Idaho 905, 556 P.2d 1185 (1976). These cases, as
with the other state court opinions, scarcely address the issue of severance of rights from
title.
59. Wilson, 634 P.2d at 368-70. The court relies heavily on Menominee Tribe, 391
U.S. 404 (1968). For example, the Wilson court cites Menominee as evidence for its argu-
ment against severance of rights and title when Menominee discusses the scope of rights
available to the tribe in pursuit of its livelihood outside of title to land.
60. 614 F.2d 1161.
61. 466 F. Supp. at 1384.
62. Id. at 1385.




aboriginal right to hunt free from state regulation on lands, then
privately owned, within the tribe's aboriginal territory. The tribe
had no treaty or reservation. The Idaho Supreme Court found ex-
tinguishment of both aboriginal title and rights by various means.
A treaty had ceded the land in question to the United States.
Although the Idaho Kootenai were not signatories to the treaty,
the court found that inclusion of the land in the treaty signified
the intent of Congress to extinguish Indian title. 6" A subsequent
Indian Claims Commission ruling sealed extinguishment by com-
pensating the Idaho Kootenai for loss of the land.6 5 The issue of
retention of aboriginal rights separate from title was addressed,
and the court's analysis evidences that it considered aboriginal ti-
tle and rights as severable interests. The court held that
"aboriginal title includes the right to hunt and fish and where
those rights have not been passed to the United States, by treaty
or otherwise, the rights continue to adhere to the current
members of the tribe which held them aboriginally." ' 66 However,
the court found that the treaty had "expressed [an] intent to
terminate the Indian title to the land . . . and equally expressed
[an] intent to leave certain rights untouched." ' 67 The assertion of
the aboriginal right to hunt was found to be extinguished because
the right was no longer aboriginal but was treaty-reserved and
had been exercised on private land not included in the meaning of
"open and unclaimed." ' 68 Nevertheless, Coffee allows for the
possibility of retaining aboriginal rights separate from title.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Gem-
mill also addressed the question of aboriginal title.69 The case
consolidated two appeals from offenses arising on national forest
land, the aboriginal territory of the Pit River Indian Tribe. Some
members of the tribe appealed convictions for illegally cutting
Christmas trees, and others appealed convictions for trespass, in
an attempt to halt logging operations on sacred lands. Both ap-
peals centered on the issue of whether the tribe still possessed
aboriginal title to the land. The court examined the scope of
aboriginal title and concluded that such title was a permissive
right of occupancy and extinguishable by the United States upon
64. Id., 556 P.2d at 1187.
65. Id., 556 P.2d at 1188.
66. Id., 556 P.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).
67. Id., 556 P.2d at 1192.
68. Id.
69. 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
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some clear expression of intent." Loss of title was found in a
series of events which, combined, evidenced congressional intent
to extinguish. The opinion first cites the California Land Claims
Act of 1851 as revoking rights to land if homestead claims had
not been perfected by patent within a specified period of time.'
Because some ambiguity in the intent to extinguish was noted, the
court enumerated further actions resulting in loss of title. These
actions included forcible and permanent removal, withdrawal of
the land as a managed forest reserve and later as a national
forest, and an Indian Claims Commission compensation to the
tribe for the land. 72 The court failed to address directly the issue
of retained-use rights. By leaving this question unanswered, it
must be inferred that the tribe lost all its interests in the area by
these enumerated acts.
In failing to identify the single act signifying congressional in-
tent to extinguish aboriginal title, the court stated that "[a]ny one
of these actions, examined in isolation, may not provide an un-
equivocal answer to the question of extinguishment." 73 The Land
Claims Act and the withdrawal of the area for forestry purposes
are not conclusive evidence of congressional intent to terminate
Indian occupancy.74 The Court of Claims settlement and military
removal were the only acts that directly addressed the Indian oc-
cupants.
In Wahkiakum Band of Chinook Indians v. Bateman, the
Wahkiakum argued that they retained aboriginal rights to fish at
their usual and accustomed sites.75  The Wahkiakum are
signatories to an unratified treaty. 6 The band is able to exercise
70. 535 F.2d at 1147. The Court cites McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) and
Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), as authority for calling Indian title a permissive right
of occupancy granted by the federal government to aboriginal possessors of the land. This
premise contains a basic fallacy from the outset as aboriginal possession is not a grant
from the federal government. McIntosh specifically recognized prior possessory rights in
the original inhabitants and described that right as being as sacred as the fee of the
whites. Tee-Hit-Ton stands not for the proposition that Indian title is merely possessory
but that the possessory right is not subject to compensation for takings under the fifth
amendment.
71. Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1148, citing Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631.
72. Id. at 1148.
73. Id. at 1149.
74. See United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd and remanded,
470 U.S. 39 (1985), for a discussion of the various uses to which land may be put while re-
taining aboriginal title.
75. 655 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1981).




treaty rights by affiliation with treaty tribes. In disposing of the
claim to aboriginal fishing rights, the court of appeals ruled that
those rights had been extinguished by an act of Congress that
provided payment to the Wahkiakum for all claims they had
against the United States."' When the court considered if this
payment pertained to rights other than title, its analysis of the act
proved that Congress believed those rights had been extinguished
by the unratified treaty.78 The band had attempted reservation of
some rights for which government compensation was urged but
never forthcoming. In finding that the Wahkiakums' fishing
rights had been extinguished by unratified congressional expres-
sion, the court went on to say that it did "not necessarily agree
that there can be any aboriginal fishing rights in the context of a
tribe which no longer holds title to any lands and is not a
signatory to any ratified treaty."7 9 This language can be inter-
preted to leave open the possibility that aboriginal rights can sur-
vive where they have not been expressly extinguished.
United States v. Dann (Dann II) arose out of trespass charges
in which individual Western Shoshone Indians asserted grazing
rights on lands within the tribe's aboriginal territory." In Dann
I,' the government contended that an Indian Claims Commission
ruling and recommended settlement agreement constituted extin-
guishment of the tribe's aboriginal title. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Dann II ruled that the Commission proceeding and
award were insufficient to extinguish aboriginal title on two
grounds. First, the Commission did not have jurisdictional
authority to extinguish aboriginal title because extinguishment
could only occur by congressional action evidencing that intent.8 2
Second, since final payment by the Commission had not been
made to the tribe, and in fact was actively resisted by the tribe,
extinguishment by acceptance of compensation cannot be in-
ferred. 3 On review, the Supreme Court, never addressing the
issue of extinguishment of aboriginal title, restricted itself to the
77. Id. at 180-81.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 180 n.12.
80. 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983).
81. 572 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1978).
82. Dann II, 706 F.2d 919, 928 (9th Cir. 1983). The court ruled that the Indian
Claims Commission has only the power to award compensation for claims of taking of
aboriginal title or other action of the United States affecting Indian land or rights. The
Commission does not have authority to extinguish Indian title.
83. Id.
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narrow question of whether payment had been achieved by certi-
fication of the Commission award and subsequent appropriation
by Congress. In reversing the court of appeals on that issue, the
Supreme Court ruled that payment occurs "when funds are
placed by the United States into an account in the Treasury of the
United States for the Tribe." 84 The Court determined that Con-
gress had delegated authority to the Commission to dispose of In-
dian claims to payment for land and that such payment consti-
tuted a "full discharge of the United States of all claims and
demands touching any other matters involved in the
controversy." 85 In other words, the Commission was responsible
for certifying payment of valid claims, and once payment was re-
quested by a tribe and authorized by the Commission no further
claims regarding the land would be heard. This approach as-
sumed that tribes were requesting payment in lieu of title to land.
By its silence, the Supreme Court left intact the court of ap-
peals' analysis of several actions raised in Dann II by the govern-
ment as evidence of extinguishment: application of public land
laws, including homestead laws, creation of an executive order
reservation for the tribe, and management of the lands in ques-
tion under the Taylor Grazing Act. 6 All of these claims failed for
lack of express congressional intent to extinguish aboriginal title.
In addition, the Danns claimed that only Congress exercises ex-
clusive control over extinguishment of title and that executive ac-
tion, such as creation of a reservation, is insufficient. The court
of appeals responded: "We agree that executive action wholly
unauthorized by Congress could not effect an extinguishment. '" 7
The court further held that "Congress must make clear its intent
to permit extinguishment as a result of any given piece of legisla-
tion.""8 The government's claim that public lands acts and
homestead laws extinguished aboriginal title failed because the
court of appeals did "not find ... the clear expression of intent
that would be required ... to hold that the homestead laws alone
extinguish aboriginal Indian title in every state and territory
where they were generally applicable."8 9 Establishment of a re-
84. Dann 11, 470 U.S. at 44-45.
85. Id., citing Indian Claims Comm'n Act, 25 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1976).
86. Dann I1, 706 F.2d 919.
87. Id., citing Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 234 (1923).
88. Dann If, 706 F.2d at 929. The Supreme Court's action in the case reaffirms this
proposition by finding that the legislation creating the Indian Claims Commission
delegated the authority to resolve Indian claims with finality. See 470 U.S. at 45.




servation for the tribe also failed as an expression of intent to ex-
tinguish aboriginal title.90 As a basis for its decision, the court of
appeals relied on the rationale applied in Santa Fe.91 There, as
will be recalled, the tribe was considered to have abandoned its
aboriginal territory by requesting removal to a reservation. Since
the same circumstances did not exist in Dann H1, the court of ap-
peals found that establishment of the reservation alone had not
resulted in extinguishment of aboriginal title.
The court of appeals disposed of the government's final con-
tention, that the Taylor Grazing Act extinguished aboriginal title,
by concluding that there was no congressional intent to extinguish
title in the legislation.
The court of appeals in Dann I addressed the prior opinion in
United States v. Gemmill,92 which held, in relevant part, that
establishment of a national forest was evidence of intent to ex-
tinguish aboriginal title. It clarified its ruling in Gemmill saying
that forcible military removal and the acceptance of the final pay-
ment of the Commission settlement were deciding factors in find-
ing extinguishment, and that inclusion in a national forest could
not alone extinguish aboriginal title. 93
The Dann II opinion is helpful in identifying means that are
successful or unsuccessful in extinguishing aboriginal title. It also
reaffirms the principle that extinguishment can only be effective
if Congress expressly approves it. Despite reversal by the Supreme
Court on the issue of effective payment, the opinion retains al-
ternatives for asserting aboriginal title and rights. The Supreme
Court expressly declined ruling on the issue of whether the Danns
retained individual aboriginal title, recognizing that the issue had
not been addressed by the lower courts and should first be dis-
cussed there.94 Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme
Court discuss whether aboriginal rights can exist separately from
title, however, leaving the question unanswered.
Recently, in United States v. Pend Oreille County Public
Utilities District No. 1,91 survivorship of aboriginal title was fur-
90. Id. at 931.
91. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 353-54. The Supreme Court held that it could "find no in-
dication that Congress by creating a reservation intended to extinguish all of the rights
which the Walapais had in their ancestral home. That Congress could have effected such
an extinguishment cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude of the
Federal Government for its Indian wards," cited in Dann II, 706 F.2d at 931.
92. 706 F.2d at 932, citing Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
93. 706 F.2d at 932.
94. 470 U.S. at 50.
95. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984). Proceedings in this matter are pending:
No. I ]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
ther strengthened by ruling that the equal footing doctrine did
not extinguish aboriginal title to the Pend Oreille River bed and
banks. Asserting that the equal footing doctrine vested title to
stream beds and banks in the state, the Public Utilities District
and state of Washington sought summary judgment against the
Kalispel Indian Tribe, which claimed aboriginal title to the Pend
Oreille River bed and banks. The court ruled that the Kalispel In-
dian Tribe could retain aboriginal title to that portion of the river
because under the equal footing doctrine, "States obtained only
that title which the United States actually held before Statehood,
and in the case of Indian lands that was the bare fee."' 6 The
Court concluded that the United States would not have absolute
title for the purpose of conveyance until aboriginal title was ex-
tinguished. In ruling that "[o]nly Congress has authority to ex-
tinguish aboriginal title,"'" the Court found that creation of an
executive order reservation unauthorized by Congress and an In-
dian Claims Commission settlement were ineffective means of ex-
tinguishment of aboriginal title.9" The issue of severable use rights
was never addressed.
Conclusion
Aboriginal title has been recognized by the federal government
and the judiciary as a significant and legally enforceable occu-
pancy right. The right of occupancy includes the right to use the
land and carry on a way of life in its traditional manner. The
question of whether aboriginal rights can exist independent of
aboriginal title, however, is one that remains unanswered.
Although several cases have struggled with survival of aboriginal
title, few have dealt with severance of aboriginal rights from title.
Some state court cases have ruled that loss of aboriginal title ex-
tinguishes any use rights; however, these courts supported their
findings by showing extinguishment on other, more express,
grounds. In addition, these opinions fail to recognize the parallel
that can easily be made between aboriginal and treaty rights.
Treaty-reserved rights find their origin in aboriginal rights and
motion for summary judgment was denied. The tribe is asserting aboriginal title claims to
the bed and banks of the Pend Oreille River, setting forth proof of aboriginal occupancy
and use. Telephone interview with Robert D. Dellwo, Attorney for the Kalispel Tribe
(Jan. 23, 1985).
96. Id. at 609.





can be extinguished only by express congressional action. The
same standard applies to aboriginal title and rights. The primary
difference in extinguishment of these two types of rights is made
clear by the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton. Treaty-reserved rights are
compensable upon extinguishment whereas aboriginal rights are
not. Whether a right is compensable and whether a right has been
extinguished are separate and distinct questions. A right can be
extinguished by compensation, but the fact that a right is non-
compensable does not automatically mean it is nonexistent. The
veracity of this argument is illustrated in the 1983 ruling in Dann
H1, which found aboriginal title continued in lands that had been
the object of homestead laws, public land laws, and management
under the Taylor Grazing Act. The deciding factor of whether a
right, either aboriginal or treaty-reserved, can be extinguished is a
clear and express congressional intent to do so.
Another parallel that can be drawn between aboriginal and
treaty-reserved rights is that treaty-reserved rights can exist after
occupancy of the land is extinguished. The original purpose
behind recognition of use rights was one of practical necessity.
The Indians had to be able to exercise customary usage in order
to survive. At the same time, there was recognition of preserva-
tion of the Indian way of life. A way of life is a cultural, rather
than a property concept, and therefore does not cease when title
to land ceases.
Although recent decisions directly addressing the issue of
aboriginal title have not favorably addressed survival of such
rights, they are distinguishable and do not foreclose the possibil-
ity of asserting aboriginal rights separate from title. Some cases
also contain encouraging language. The United States Court of
Appeals in Wahkiakum Band does not totally bar the possibility
of aboriginal rights existing in nontreaty tribes possessing no title
to land. The United States v. Felter ruling declares that extin-
guishment of aboriginal or treaty-reserved rights must follow the
same requirements regardless of their origin. Additionally, the
Idaho Supreme Court in Coffee stated that where aboriginal
rights have not passed to the United States by some express
means, they continue to exist.
Finally, the more recent Supreme Court ruling in Dann II
enunciates that participation in an Indian Claims Commission
settlement resulting in certification and appropriation of payment
forecloses the possibility of asserting aboriginal title and rights to
the land at issue. The Supreme Court's silence on all but the issue
of payment preserves the opportunity of asserting aboriginal
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rights despite a history of land-use policies that could have
proved mutually exclusive to retention of such rights. Instead, the
Dann 11 opinion reaffirms that express congressional intent to ex-
tinguish aboriginal title and rights is required.
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